The evidence presented here is inconsistent with variants of corporate finance theory which hold that the option properties of growth opportunities or asset substitution incentives are first-order determinants of equity values, but it is supportive of risk management and capital structure theories that emphasize the costs of expected cash flow volatility. Specifically, controlling for known determinants of changes in shareholder wealth, we find that the change in shareholder wealth over one year is inversely related to the change in expected equity volatility over the same year in cross-section regressions. This relation holds consistently through time for all but the largest firms. It is stronger for firms with poor growth opportunities and weak financial health. When we decompose volatility into beta risk and idiosyncratic risk, we find that shareholder wealth is positively related to beta changes, so that our evidence cannot be explained by a beta effect. Nor can the evidence be explained by the impact of returns on volatility.
Introduction.
The value of a firm's equity is equal to expected equity cash flows discounted at the expected return investors require for cash flows of comparable risk. Consequently, an increase in equity volatility can affect shareholder wealth by changing either the discount rate or expected cash flows. The asset pricing literature has established that investors do not discount more volatile cash flows at a higher rate if the exposure of cash flows to priced risk factors is kept constant.
However, corporate finance theory argues that changes in cash flow volatility affect expected cash flows. This paper investigates the relation between shareholder wealth and expected cash flow volatility using equity volatility as a proxy for cash flow volatility.
Since Merton (1974) , modern finance theory views equity as an option on firm value.
Everything else equal, option pricing theory therefore predicts that an unexpected increase in volatility should increase equity value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that equity holders have incentives to increase equity volatility since doing so reduces the value of the firm's debt. The literature on real options emphasizes the option properties of growth opportunities. With these properties, increases in the volatility of growth opportunities make growth options more valuable and increase equity volatility. Consequently, there should be a positive relation between equity volatility and value for firms with valuable growth opportunities.
Capital structure and risk management theories argue that increases in volatility also have a detrimental effect for shareholder wealth that can be of first-order importance.
1 These theories point out that greater firm volatility hurts shareholders since, for given leverage, it reduces the present value of the firm's tax shields from debt and increases the present value of costs of financial distress. With these theories, an increase in equity volatility affects shareholders adversely by reducing expected cash flows.
Since the corporate finance literature finds that an increase in equity volatility has both positive and negative effects on shareholder wealth, empirical research is required to find out the nature of the relation between shareholder wealth and changes in equity volatility. Surprisingly, there is no direct empirical evidence that we know of on whether shareholder wealth increases or decreases with expected equity volatility taking into account known determinants of changes in shareholder wealth. We find that there is a significant negative relation between equity returns in year t and the change in equity volatility from year t to year t+1. This negative relation is robust through time.
After showing that the relation we uncover is robust, we investigate how it varies across firms. The real options argument suggests that equity volatility changes should not have an adverse effect or, at least, should have less of an adverse effect for firms with high growth opportunities. We find that an increase in volatility affects firms with high growth opportunities adversely, but less so than firms with low growth opportunities. According to agency theory, shareholders should benefit most from increases in volatility for highly levered firms. Instead, we find that an increase in volatility is most costly for firms with low interest coverage, low investment, and low cash flow as one would expect with the capital structure and risk management theories that emphasize costs of financial distress. We find that the impact of an increase in volatility is inversely related to firm size. This result is consistent with the theories that emphasize costs of financial distress in that larger firms have generally better access to capital markets and benefit from economies of scale in risk management.
Our evidence relates to several empirical literatures. First, there is evidence that cash flow volatility has real effects on firms. In particular, Minton and Schrand (2000) show that there is a negative contemporaneous relation between cash flow volatility and investment. Second, there is a large literature that examines the determinants and implications of risk management practices. This literature finds support for risk management theories that emphasize costs of financial distress. Perhaps more directly related to this paper, Allayannis and Weston (2001) show that firms that use foreign exchange derivatives have higher value.
Following Black (1996) and Christie (1982) , a number of papers have examined how changes in equity value affect equity volatility (for instance, Cheung and Ng (1992) , Duffee (1995) , Bekaert and Wu (2000) , and Figlewski and Wang (2000) ). The starting point for these papers is the result that if firm volatility and the face value of debt are constant, a decrease in firm value increases leverage and therefore increases the volatility of equity. Hence, rather than being explained by the effect of changes in volatility on equity value, our results could come from the impact on volatility of changes in firm value. The impact on volatility of changes in firm value is generally called the leverage effect. 2 We show that for the leverage effect to explain our results,
we would have to find a much stronger impact of volatility changes on firms with low leverage than firms with high leverage. We can always reject that hypothesis.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data we use and our volatility measures. In Section 3, we show that there is a robust negative relation between shareholder wealth and changes in volatility. We investigate the determinants of that relation in Section 4 and address the issue of whether changes in firm value can explain our results in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
The sample and the risk measures.
In this paper, we want to understand how and why increases in expected equity volatility affect shareholder wealth taking into account other determinants of shareholder wealth. It is therefore important for us to be able to measure changes in firm characteristics that could explain changes in shareholder wealth and to identify firm characteristics that could explain the impact of a change in equity volatility on shareholder wealth. For this reason, we measure the change in shareholder wealth by the one-year return on equity. We start with all firms available on the CRSP database for which records in COMPUSTAT exist during the period from 1964 to 1997. A firm has to have at least 100 returns in a year to be included in the sample for that year. We drop 1% of the observations in each tail of each independent variable used in the regressions we report and require that sample firms have at least one million dollars of assets.
The corporate finance literature referred to in the introduction argues that expected cash flows to equity depend on expected equity cash flow volatility. Because cash flows are observed infrequently and because firms change their activities, using a time series model to forecast equity cash flows to have a measure of expected equity cash flow volatility is not a promising approach.
However, equity is the present value of equity cash flows. Consequently, an increase in the expected volatility of equity cash flows translates directly into an increase in expected equity volatility. Greater volatility in expected risk premia could increase equity volatility also. This effect would be the same for all firms that have the same exposure to priced risk factors. Further, an increase in market volatility theoretically leads to an increase in the risk premium on the market, thereby increasing expected returns but affecting contemporaneous returns adversely. 3 To take these effects into account, it is therefore important for us to control for exposure to common risk factors across firms.
Several approaches could be contemplated to measure expected equity volatility. One approach would be to use a time-series model. Since we require a forecast of the one-year volatility, estimating such a model would limit sharply the number of firms in our sample. A second approach would be to use implied volatilities. However, we want our study to use a broad cross-section of firms rather than only firms that have traded options. We use a third approach which takes maximum advantage of the high frequency with which stock prices are observed. We do not observe the market's expectation of the firm's risk for year t+1, but we can use the realized volatility in year t+1 estimated from daily returns as our proxy for expected volatility for year t+1. With rational expectations, our proxy for the market's expectation is the market's expectation plus a random error. This error biases the slope of the regression coefficient towards zero when the only independent variable is the risk measure. As a result, we might fail to find a significant relation between changes in risk and changes in firm value because of the errors-in-variables problem.
We estimate the yearly standard deviation of a stock's return using daily returns following Schwert (1989) for the fiscal year period (not for the calendar period). The estimator of the variance of the yearly return is the sum of the squared daily log returns after subtracting the average daily log return in the fiscal year:
where there are N t daily log returns, r jt , in fiscal year t firm j. A concern with daily returns is that serial correlation might affect our results. We estimated volatilities using weekly returns and our conclusions do not change.
Throughout the paper, we include in our regressions variables that are useful to predict returns. In addition to accounting variables, we use the market value of firm equity to proxy for a size effect, market-to-book to proxy for value versus growth, industry dummy variables to proxy for industry effects, and the market model beta to capture a firm's exposure to the market. Beta plays two different roles in the analysis. First, in the cross-section, higher beta stocks are more exposed to market movements and therefore should have higher returns when the market has a positive return. Second, with the capital asset pricing model, the expected return of a stock increases with beta. To estimate beta, we use the market model:
3 See Merton (1980) for the risk premium effect and Campbell and Hentschel (1992) for a discussion of the contemporaneous effect. As reviewed in Bekaert and Wu (2000) , evidence on the relation between the risk premium on the market and market volatility is mixed.
where r ij is the log return of firm j for day i and r mi is the log return of the CRSP value-weighted index for day i. We report results using ordinary-least-squares estimates of the market model. We also estimated Scholes-Williams β's, which led to similar results. With the capital asset pricing model, systematic risk is the product of β j 2 and the variance of the market return, while unsystematic risk is the variance of ε ij .
3. The relation between shareholder wealth and changes in equity volatility.
Our first investigation of the relation between shareholder wealth and equity volatility changes proceeds as follows. For year t, we consider all firms for which we have data in year t-1, t, and t+1. We then compute the equity return of a firm for year t and the change in equity volatility from year t to year t+1. Table 1 shows the average equity return in excess of the oneyear T-bill yield for the deciles of changes in equity volatility for our whole sample period. The average excess equity return falls almost monotonically as the change in equity volatility increases. The firms with a change in equity volatility in the top decile have a return that is insignificantly different from zero. The average return difference between the top decile and the bottom decile of equity volatility changes is 25.5% with a t-statistic of 9.80. From 1964 to 1997, the return difference between the top and the bottom decile is negative only in 1970 -one year out of 34. When the stock market has a positive return, we would expect high beta stocks to earn more than low beta stocks. For a given correlation between a stock and the market, beta is positively related to volatility. Not using beta as an explanatory variable could lead us to conclude that high volatility stocks have higher returns than low volatility stocks simply because volatility proxies for beta. In all the regressions of Table 2 , we therefore use beta as a way to capture differences in returns across stocks that can be explained simply by market movements. The purpose of having beta as an independent variable is to soak up as much of the cross-sectional variation in returns as can be explained by market movements. We therefore use beta estimated in year t for regressions in year t in the regressions we report. We estimated our regressions without controlling for beta and the conclusions of the paper are unaffected. Table 2 shows estimates of the slope for changes in equity volatility for the whole sample and for two subperiods using four sets of control variables and for a subsample that excludes financial firms and utilities. Regression (1) shows estimates of the relation between equity returns and changes in equity volatility that control only for beta. For the whole sample and both subperiods, we find that there is a negative relation between equity returns and changes in equity volatility. The Fama-McBeth t-statistic on the change in volatility is -6.15 for the whole sample and exceeds 4 for each of the subsamples. In regression (2), we also control for industry by industry dummy variables determined by the firm's two-digit SIC code, the log of the firm's age, and the log of the firm's assets. The firm's age is the number of years for which the firm is recorded in COMPUSTAT files. The firm's assets are measured in 1992 dollars using the Consumers Price Index as a deflator. The results are similar to those in regression (1). In regression (3), we add the contemporaneous change in earnings to regression (2). We find similar results, but the coefficient on volatility and its t-statistic fall. In the following, we will report in tables results that use the control variables of regression (3), but we will discuss results using other sets of control variables. To understand the economic significance of the coefficient on the change in volatility in Table 2 , it is useful to note that the standard deviation of the volatility change is 0.33. Consequently, a one standard deviation increase in the volatility change decreases shareholder wealth by 15.6%. In regression (4), we repeat regression (3), but without utilities and financial firms. Financial firms are firms with an SIC between 6000 and 6999. Utilities are firms with an SIC between 4900 and 4999. Our results are not affected.
In regression (5), we use as control variables in addition to beta the variables used in Fama and French (1998) . In their paper, they choose these control variables to soak up all the variation in Tobin's q. We use changes in these variables. We therefore have changes in R&D, earnings, interest payments, and dividends from t-1 to t and from t to t+1 as well as changes in firm market value from t to t+1. All variables are normalized by total assets at t. Some of these variables will be affected by changes in volatility with some of the arguments discussed in the introduction about how volatility impacts shareholder wealth. For instance, a shock in volatility in year t could increase the cost of capital of the firm, thereby reducing investment during year t+1.
Consequently, using the variables as control variables biases the results against finding an impact of volatility on returns and we should expect that using these variables would weaken our results.
However, the benefit of these regressions is that they show that our result holds even if a whole kitchen sink of variables is used to try to explain changes in shareholder wealth. Using these control variables weakens the return/volatility relation but it is always significant nevertheless.
In Table 2 , we show that the equity return is negatively related to the change in equity volatility. Such a result is consistent with equity volatility being costly for shareholders, but it could also be a statistical artifact. In particular, an important concern about the results in Table 2 is that the relation we estimate could be explained by skewness in the distribution of simple returns. This concern follows from Duffee (1995) . Simple returns are bounded below by -1 but are not bounded above. Consequently, large absolute value returns at t will be positive returns, thereby leading to a situation where a high volatility at t is associated with a high return at t.
Keeping volatility at t+1 constant, this argument implies that there should be a negative relation between equity returns and volatility changes because there is a positive relation between volatility at t and returns at t. We address this problem in two different ways. First, we re-estimate the regressions of Table 1 with continuously compounded returns. There is no lower bound for continuously compounded returns. The first panel of Table 3 shows estimates of regressions (3) of Table 2 for continuously-compounded returns. Using continuously compounded returns reduces the size of the coefficient on the volatility change but increases its t-statistic. Now the tstatistic for the whole sample period exceeds 9. Though we report the results using simple returns in the paper, we estimated all our regressions using continuously compounded returns also. In general, using continuously compounded returns seems to strengthen the results, but a few of the results are sensitive to the returns we use and we discuss this where appropriate.
A second way to address the skewness problem is to separate the change in volatility into two variables, volatility at t and volatility at t+1. Volatility at t+1 is not associated with returns at t, so that it is not affected by skewness of returns at t. Therefore, if our results are spurious because of skewness, we should find that there is a much weaker or even no relation between volatility at t+1 and returns at t. It is clear from the second panel of Table 3 that this is not the case. We find a significant positive coefficient for volatility at t and a significant negative coefficient for volatility at t+1 in all the regressions not only for the regressions reported in Table 3 but also for the other specifications of Table 2 . In the second subsample period, volatility at t+1 never has a t-statistic below 5 for the regression specifications reported in Table 2 . In contrast, volatility at t never has a t-statistic above 3. In regressions that we do not report in the Table, we omit year t volatility altogether. In one set of regressions, we use only t+1 volatility. Volatility at t+1 has a significant negative coefficient. In another set of regressions, we compute the volatility change from t-1 to t+1, skipping year t volatility. The coefficient on this change is -0.164 with a t-statistic of -3.56.
We report in the Table tests of two other possible explanations for our results. With any asset pricing model where beta earns a risk premium, an increase in beta for given expected cash flows should decrease shareholder wealth because it means that expected cash flows are discounted at a higher rate. Hence, it could be that our result has no implications for the relation between equity volatility and shareholder wealth, but is simply due to the fact that an increase in beta leads to a higher discount rate for a firm's expected cash flows. A simple way to check this explanation for our results is to split the change in equity volatility into one piece due to the change in beta and another piece due to the change in idiosyncratic risk in the market model regression. Rather than using the estimate of equity volatility constructed from equation (1), we estimate the market model for each firm during year t. With the market model regression, beta squared times the variance of the market is the firm's risk due to its beta. In Panel 3 of Table 3 , we see that an increase in systematic risk actually increases shareholder wealth. Hence, this effect goes in the opposite direction of what we would need to find for a change in beta to explain our results.
Admittedly, beta can be measured with error. However, this is not an important issue here, since increases in beta risk cannot explain our results.
The final robustness check reported in the Table tests whether the impact of an increase in equity volatility is symmetric, namely whether increases and decreases in equity volatility have the same effect on equity returns in absolute value. For this check, we split changes in volatility between increases and decreases in volatility. If the relation between equity returns and changes in volatility were symmetric, we would expect the coefficient on increases in volatility to be the same as the coefficient on decreases in volatility. We see in Panel 4 of Table 3 that we cannot reject that the relation between changes in volatility and equity returns is symmetric for all our regressions. In regressions not reported in the Table, we find weak evidence of asymmetry with the Fama and French control variables, but not for the second half of the sample. Interestingly, the evidence that the relation is symmetric seems to depend somewhat on whether the returns are simple or continuously compounded. With continuously compounded returns, increases in volatility seem to have more of an impact than decreases in volatility, except with the Fama and French control variables. This seems consistent with skewness playing some role in the return/volatility relation, since using continuously-compounded returns makes the distribution of returns more symmetric and gives less weight in regressions to the largest positive returns.
The results we report in the tables do not include market-to-book, the logarithm of the market value of equity, and leverage as explanatory variables. We prefer omitting them because they depend on expectations of future volatility. However, we estimated regressions with these additional control variables as well. The conclusions we reach with these additional control variables are the same as those we reach with the regressions reported in the tables in this section.
The determinants of the relation between equity returns and changes in expected equity volatility.
The bottom line from all the regressions in this section is that there is a negative relation between equity returns and changes in volatility from t to t+1. This negative relation is not explained by skewness or by changes in systematic risk. It is consistent with the hypothesis that an increase in expected volatility affects shareholders adversely. In this section, we investigate whether the return/volatility relation differs across firm types. For this analysis, we report in Table 4 regressions using beta, assets, firm age, industry dummies, and the change in earnings as control variables, but we estimated our regressions for other specifications not reported in the table and discuss those when appropriate. In all cases, we define a firm's type based on characteristics observed at the end of year t-1, which is before we compute returns or volatility.
Consider the impact of an unexpected increase in equity volatility on a levered firm. In
Merton's (1973) model, an increase in volatility increases the value of equity and equity is more sensitive to volatility as leverage increases. With that model, we would therefore expect shareholders to benefit more from increases in volatility as leverage increases. In contrast, in a static tradeoff model of capital structure, an increase in volatility leads to a higher probability of distress for the existing capital structure. Eventually, one would expect that the firm would change its capital structure to reflect the new volatility. Since volatility has increased, the firm will choose to have less debt, so that the present value of the tax benefits of debt will fall. Hence, in the static tradeoff capital structure model, an increase in volatility has an adverse effect on firm value. Financial distress is less likely for firms with either low leverage or high interest coverage.
One would expect the relation between returns and volatility to be weaker for such firms.
In Panels 1 and 2 of Table 4 , we show estimates of our regressions for sample splits according to leverage computed using the ratio of liabilities to book assets and according to interest coverage. In each case, we split the sample into three groups (the bottom 30%, the middle 40%, and the top 30% of the distribution of a firm characteristic) formed using a firm characteristic observed at the end of year t-1. Leverage is measured as liabilities to assets and interest coverage is measured as earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes over interest paid. We find clear evidence that the return/volatility relation is steeper for firms with lower interest coverage. However, even for the firms with high interest coverage, the return/volatility relation is significant. When we turn to leverage, the return/volatility relation does not vary significantly according to leverage groups. In regressions not reported in the Table, we find that whether the relation differs across leverage groups depends on the sample used as well as on the specification of the regression. If we re-estimate the regression excluding utilities and financial firms, the relation is significantly different between high and low leverage firms at the 10% level.
If we re-estimate the regression using continuously compounded returns, there is a significant difference between high and low leverage firms regardless of whether we exclude utilities and financial firms or not. However, when we estimate the return/volatility relation using continuously compounded returns with the Fama and French controls, there is no significant difference between high and low leverage groups. Consequently, whether the relation differs depending on firm leverage seems sensitive to the variables we control for. We estimated no regression where high leverage firms have a significantly less negative return/volatility relation than low leverage firms. Therefore, we found no support for the view that volatility shocks are first-order determinants of equity values because of the option property of equity.
One would expect firms with poor financial health to be the most vulnerable to unexpected increases in volatility. This turns out to be the case. We first split the sample firms in each year based on cash flow to total assets and then estimate the return/volatility relation the next year. We find that the slope of the relation is significantly more negative for firms with low cash flow. The difference in the slope between high and low cash flow firms is significant across all the specifications that we investigated. Firms that are financially constrained invest less. This leads us to split the sample according to investment to total assets. Again, we find that firms that invest less are firms with a significantly more negative return/volatility relation. However, investment seems less useful in predicting the return/volatility relation when we use continuously compounded returns.
Small firms find it harder to access capital markets since they are less likely to have publicly traded debt. Splitting the sample into three size classes based on the value of the firm's equity, we find that the return/volatility relation does not hold for the largest firms. A concern with this result is that it may be due to the fact that volatility is more volatile for small firms than for large firms. Our size split includes as large firms all firms that have greater equity value than the 70 th percentile of the NYSE firms and as small firms all firms with lower equity value than the 30 th percentile of the NYSE firms. The standard deviation of the volatility change is 0.098 for large firms and 0.44 for small firms. We investigated for large firms whether the impact of an increase in volatility is more negative for firms with lower interest coverage. The coefficient on the volatility change is always more negative for large firms with lower interest coverage than for large firms with higher interest coverage. The difference in coefficient between low interest coverage large firms and high interest coverage large firms is significant when we exclude utilities and financial companies. Surprisingly, large firms with high interest coverage that are not utilities and financial companies significantly benefit from an increase volatility.
The real options model predicts that the return/volatility relation should be less negative for firms with better growth opportunities. We use the ratio of the market value of the firm to its book value as a proxy for growth opportunities. The market value of the firm is estimated as the value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. The ratio proxies for Tobin's q. Admittedly, firms with the lowest Tobin's q are firms that not only do not have valuable growth opportunities but also presumably are weak financially. We find that firms with a high q have a less steep return/volatility relation than firms with a low Tobin's q. This holds true regardless of the specification, with one exception, namely if we use continuously-compounded returns and do not control for earnings. We investigated two other approaches to split the sample according to growth opportunities. First, we split the sample according to R&D expenditures.
Since so many firms have only trivial R&D expenditures, we split the sample according to whether firms have non-trivial R&D expenditures. We find that firms with non-trivial R&D expenditures have a less negative return/volatility relation, but not significantly so. Second, we split the sample according to where a firm is traded. We find weak evidence that the return/volatility relation is more negative for NYSE/AMEX firms than it is for NASDAQ firms.
We estimated regressions on subsamples using different control variables, using only firms that are not utilities or financial firms, and using continuously compounded returns. In all these regressions, the return/volatility relation is significant for all our regressions except when we choose a sample of large firms. One could argue, though, that significance ought to be judged more conservatively. The reason for this being that the slopes are not independent across years.
Suppose that we are extremely conservative and require a t-statistic of 4 in absolute value to be convinced that there is a negative relation between returns and volatility changes. In Table 4 , the coefficient on volatility changes has a t-statistic lower than 4 in absolute value only for high cash flow firms, high R&D firms, and large firms. If instead we use continuously compounded returns for the regressions reported in the table, we find that the coefficient is insignificant only for high R&D firms and large firms.
It is interesting to note that our conclusion that the return/volatility relation is strongest for firms with low cash flow and low interest coverage holds even if we do not use volatility at t in our regressions. We re-estimated Table 4 using volatility at t+1 instead of the change in volatility.
If we do that, we still find that the return/volatility relation is stronger for firms with low cash flow and low interest coverage, but the weaker results disappear. We also re-estimated Table 4 computing the change in volatility from t-1 to t+1. The impact on our results is the same. With these regressions, the return/volatility relation is not significant for firms with high cash flow or for firms with high interest coverage.
The results presented in Table 4 allow the impact of the control variables to vary across subsamples. This raises the question of whether our results depend on this assumption. To investigate this issue, we re-estimated our regressions, but instead of splitting the sample into three groups each year, we used the groups to define interactive dummy variables. Consequently, we estimated the return relation for the three groups, but forced the control variables to have the same slopes for each group. Proceeding this way does not lead to changes in our conclusions.
An examination of the reverse causation hypothesis
So far, we have shown a negative relation between changes in equity volatility and shareholder wealth. We have seen that this relation is stronger for firms with lower interest coverage, lower cash flow, and lower Tobin's q. This evidence is consistent with the arguments in the risk management and capital structure literatures that total risk affects firm value adversely.
However, at this point, we have to consider carefully the argument that the relation we have analyzed results from the fact that equity in a levered firm is an option on firm value, since the shareholders have the option to buy the firm by paying back the debtholders. With the BlackScholes formula, the volatility of an option increases as the value of the underlying falls.
Consequently, a decrease in firm value decreases the value of equity and increases the volatility of equity, thereby producing a negative relation between equity returns and the volatility of equity.
A number of papers estimate time-series regressions of the change in equity volatility on a firm's stock return. These papers find a negative coefficient on the firm's stock return, but not always. In particular, Cheung and Ng (1992) do not find a negative coefficient for large firms.
Christie (1992) argues that the negative relation reflect the leverage effect. To show this, he estimates a regression where the relation between volatility changes and equity returns is determined by theory and finds support for the theory. Subsequently, authors using larger samples have not found as much support for the theoretical relation as Christie. Further, Duffee (1995) makes the point that the negative relation between the change in volatility and the firm's stock returns is mostly due to the strong positive relation between volatility and the contemporaneous stock return. He attributes this strong positive relation to the skewness in stock returns.
Before assessing whether our results could be explained by the leverage effect, we have to find out what this effect implies for our regressions. Remember that Merton (1974) values equity as an option on firm value where the exercise price is equal to the face value of discount debt.
With this model, an increase in firm value decreases the volatility of equity. As the ratio of the value of equity to the value of the firm increases, the volatility of equity falls as it converges asymptotically to the volatility of the firm. As Panel A of Figure 1 shows, the impact of changes in the value of the firm on equity volatility weakens as equity increases in value. This means that if the only reason for equity volatility changes is changes in firm value, a 100 basis point change in equity volatility is the product of a much bigger change in firm value when firm value is high than when firm value is low. Consequently, as shown in Panel B of Figure 1 , for given face value of debt, the leverage effect implies a much larger coefficient on volatility for firms with low leverage than firms with high leverage. We estimated no regression where this was true. On the contrary, any significant evidence involving leverage or involving firm value leads us to reach the opposite conclusion, namely that the return/volatility relation is weaker for firms with low leverage and firms with high value relative to book assets. To the extent that the leverage effect is at work in our data, it therefore weakens our conclusions.
Stronger evidence can be provided that our results cannot be explained by the leverage effect.
In Table 5 , we first look at the return/volatility relation for firms that have almost no leverage.
These firms have liabilities below 20% of firm value measured as the sum of liabilities plus the market value of firm equity. For these firms, we find a significant relation between returns and volatility but there is no evidence of a stronger relation for these firms than for other firms. There is more, however. We then split the firms in that sample into three groups based on interest coverage. We see that firms with low leverage but low interest coverage have a strong return/volatility relation but firms with high interest coverage have an insignificant relation. This result reaffirms the importance of interest coverage, and hence of the probability of financial distress, as a determinant of the return/volatility relation that we identified in the previous section.
The leverage effect would predict that the return/volatility relation would be strong for the firms with high interest coverage and low leverage since these firms must be the least levered in our sample.
Since the leverage effect biases our results against finding an adverse effect of volatility changes, we tried to reduce the importance of that bias in our last set of regressions. Denote by E(t) the market value of equity at t and by V(t) the market value of the firm. We estimate the market value of the firm by subtracting from total assets the book value of equity and adding the market value of equity. With the option pricing model, the volatility of the firm is [E(t-1)/V(t-1)]*s(t) if debt is assumed to be riskless, where s(t) is volatility of equity. With a pure leverage effect, the volatility of the firm is constant so that [ E(t-1)/V(t-1)]*s(t) is equal to [E(t)/V(t)]*s(t+1). Consequently, the equity volatility at t+1 predicted by the leverage effect is
We can therefore construct a predicted volatility change based on a pure leverage effect. This allows us to control directly for the volatility effect in our regressions.
Since there is a part of the volatility change that cannot be due to a pure volatility effect, we can regress returns on the unpredicted volatility -that part of volatility not explained by the leverage effect -and the predicted volatility change -that part of volatility explained by the leverage effect. If our results were due to the leverage effect, we would explain the coefficient on unpredicted volatility to be insignificantly different from zero.
In Table 6 , we provide estimates of regressions of returns on predicted and unpredicted volatility. The difficulty with such regressions is that if a firm does not change its assets and book equity, the change in E(t)/V(t) is a nonlinear function of our dependent variable. We therefore report a measure of predicted volatility that is based on book values rather than market values.
Since the change in E(t-1)/V(t-1) that is used to predict the change in volatility is added to the regression as an interaction term with volatility, we add this change as a control variable also to avoid having the change in volatility proxy for the change in leverage. Table 6 shows our regression estimates. We find that predicted and unpredicted volatility have negative significant coefficients. Further, and more importantly, the coefficient on predicted volatility does not vary across firms with different interest coverage ratios or leverage while the coefficient on unpredicted volatility does.
Conclusion.
In this paper, we explored the relation between return and changes in expected volatility.
Throughout the paper, we find that an increase in expected volatility is associated with a decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is stronger for firms that are financially weaker and have poorer growth opportunities. This evidence is consistent with corporate finance theories that emphasize the cost of total risk, but is inconsistent with theories that argue that the option properties of equity or growth opportunities are first-order effects. We saw that our evidence cannot be explained by the impact of changes in shareholder wealth on volatility, but this impact weakens our results. Further work should attempt to lessen this bias in our estimates, so that we can quantify the return/volatility relation more precisely. Also, an examination of the return/volatility relation for alternate estimators of the change in expected volatility would enable us to understand this relation better. However, the bottom line from our investigation is that we find clear evidence that changes in total risk affect shareholder wealth using a number of different regression specifications.
Political Economy 81, 607-636. 262 -0.208 1969 -0.243 -0.208 -0.188 -0.206 -0.255 -0.250 -0.223 -0.318 -0.343 -0.342 -0.099 1970 -0.294 -0.260 -0.183 -0.151 -0.078 -0.086 -0.008 -0. 023 -0.117 -0.161 -0.276 -0.317 1973 -0.362 -0.323 -0.256 -0.250 -0.232 -0.280 -0.292 -0.343 -0.351 -0.453 -0.091 1974 -0.251 -0.287 -0.271 -0.258 -0.275 -0.246 -0.270 -0.270 -0.341 -0.466 -0.215 1975 0 where E(t) is the book value of equity at t, V(t) is the book value of assets, and s(t) is equity volatility. The unpredicted change in volatility is actual volatility at t+1 minus predicted volatility. Predicted change in volatility is predicted volatility minus actual volatility at t. Control variables are changes in equity to assets ratio, beta, industry dummy variables determined by the firm's two-digit SIC code, the log of the firm's age, and the log of the firm's assets in 1997 dollars, and changes in earnings from t-1 to t. For each firm characteristic, the low and high values in a given year correspond to the bottom 30% and top 30% of the sample in that year. 
